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Central Bank Independence and Inflation: A Note  
By Charles T. Carlstrom
 




We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized 
nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved 
inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.  
 1. Introduction. 
 
A remarkable achievement among industrialized nations during the last two 
decades is the dramatic decline in annual inflation rates.  A long line of research dating to 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983ab) has argued that larger 
degrees of central bank independence can improve average inflation rates.
1  Hence, a 
natural question to ask is: how much of the improved inflation performance of the 
industrialized nations can be attributed to increased central bank independence?   
To answer this question we use two measures of central bank independence from 
two different points in time. The first is the measure of independence used by Alesina and 
Summers (1993), and represents a measure of independence for the period 1955-88.  
Second, we use a more recent measure of independence reported by Fry et al. (2000) that 
is derived from a central bank survey conducted in 1997. We restrict our analysis to the 
industrialized nations.  Since many of our nations are now part of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), we restrict the time frames to 1955-88 (the original Alesina and Summers 
(1993) time frame), and 1988-2000 (pre-ECB). 
We report three principle results. First, measured independence has significantly 
increased across time for nearly all the central banks in the survey. The average 
independence score rose from an index of 59 to an index of 83. Second, the slope of the 
linear relationship between inflation and independence that was originally reported in 
Alesina and Summers (1993), is statistically identical to the fitted slope in the more 
recent data.  This suggests some stability in the inflation-independence trade-off. Third 
and finally, using this fitted slope, we deduce that increased independence is responsible 
                                                 
1 Walsh (2004) includes a survey of this research. 
  1for nearly two thirds of the decline in the inflation rates for industrialized countries as a 
whole.  
 
2. Data and Results. 
  All of the data used for this analysis are reported in Table 1. The first three 
columns in Table 1 are the data used by Alesina and Summers (1993) in their study of 
central bank independence and inflation performance.  Alesina and Summers’ (1993) 
measure of independence is an average of the scale used by Bade and Parkin (1982) and 
the scale used by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991). Bade and Parkin’s (1982) 
measure of independence reflects “political independence” which is defined as the ability 
of the central bank to select its policy objectives without influence from the government.  
This measure is based on institutional factors such as term length of bank governors, 
whether government representatives sit on the board, etc.  Grilli et al (1991) combine this 
measure of political independence with what they term “economic independence” which 
is defined to be the ability to use monetary policy instruments without government 
restrictions, eg., whether the central bank is required to finance the government deficit.  
Alesina and Summers (1993) normalize their independence scale on a 0-4 index.  
  The remaining two columns of Table 1 report the Fry et al. (2000) data set. This 
data set includes a larger set of industrialized nations. As is clear in Table 1, countries 
that had little independence in the Alesina and Summers’ (1993) sample had significantly 
greater independence in the later sample. The variation of independence among the 
Alesina and Summers’ (1993) countries thus decreased, limiting our ability to draw 
conclusions about independence in the latter time period. Because of this we broaden our 
  2sample to include the other industrialized nations reported in Fry et al. (2000).  The new 
sample includes the original Alesina and Summers’ (1993) countries plus Austria, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Korea, Portugal, Singapore, Taiwan, and Finland.  
Fry et al.’s (2000) measure of independence follows Grilli et al. (1991) by considering a 
wide range of characteristics including governors’ term of office, legal objectives, deficit 
finance, etc. Fry et al (2000) normalize their scale from 0-100. 
  Because of the different scales, we transform Alesina and Summers’ (1993) 0-4 
scale to make this index comparable to Fry et al.’s (2000) 0-100 scale. Since the means 
have clearly changed over the period, we need another way to transform the different 
scales. We assume that the independence score for the most independent central bank 
stayed the same across the sample periods. The most independent country in the Alesina 
and Summers’ (1993) data was Germany with an independence score of 4, while in Fry et 
al.’s (2000) sample Germany had a score of 96 (essentially 100). Hence, our 
transformation amounts to multiplying the multiply the Alesina and Summers’ (1993) 
scale by 25. With this transformation it is comforting to note that the US independence 
score in the Alesina and Summers’ data set is essentially the same as it is in Fry et al. 
Arguably there was little change in US central bank independence between the two time 
periods.   
Turning first to the Alesina and Summers’ (1993) data, Figure 1 plots their 
(transformed) data along with the linear regression line. The coefficients for this 
regression line are reported in Table 2. The celebrated result of Alesina and Summers 
(1993) is the remarkably good fit of the inflation-independence trade-off with a slope 
coefficient of -0.065. 
  3  Comparing the Alesina and Summer’s data with the Fry et al. data (2000) we note 
a substantial increase in mean central bank independence scores across the two time 
periods. Independence increased from a score of 59.0 in the 1955-88 time period to 83.4 
in 1997. There was also a sharp decline in the standard deviation of independence across 
nations. This data strongly supports the assertion that the central banks of industrialized 
nations are substantially more independent than they were two decades ago. Furthermore, 
and not surprisingly, the improvement is most pronounced for the central banks that were 
the least independent in Alesina and Summers’ original study.    
The Fry et al. data (2000) is plotted in Figure 2 along with the linear regression 
line. Because all nations have substantially more independence now than in the earlier 
sample, there is less variability with which to clearly identify the slope coefficient.  
However, as noted in Table 2, the slope coefficient is statistically significant with a point 
estimate of -0.0662.  This is essentially identical to the earlier slope coefficient. An F-test 
fails to reject the hypothesis of a common slope at a 1% confidence level.   
Table 3 reports the results of a pooled regression in which we combine the 
Alesina and Summers (1993) data with the Fry et al. (2000) data.  In particular, our 
regression has 42 observations and is of the form: 
) * ( 3 2 1 0 ce Independen I I ce Independen Inflation F F β β β β + + + =  
IF is the indicator variable or the dummy which takes a value of zero for the Alesina and 
Summers (1993) data, and a value of one for the Fry et al. (2000) data. We add dummy 
variables for the Fry et al. (2000) data points to allow for a different constant (β2, the 
coefficient on the dummy) and a different slope (β3, the coefficient on the interaction 
term). The results of the pooled regressions again strongly suggest a common slope 
  4across the two samples (the interaction term is insignificant), but an intercept difference 
of about 65 basis points.  In other words, the data suggests that 65 basis points of the 2.3 
percentage point decline in inflation is due to factors other than independence. Figure 3 
plots the combined data set along with the two linear regression lines. The 65 basis point 
gap is quite apparent. 
  In summary, we conclude that the data support the assertion that: (1) central banks 
of industrialized nations are significantly more independent now than in the earlier 
sample, and (2) there is evidence of stability in the independence-inflation relationship 
across the two time periods.   
We can now use these two implications to assess the importance of independence 
in reducing mean inflation rates. Using a slope coefficient of -0.06, and the 24 point mean 
increase in independence from 59 to 83, the statistical relationship predicts a decline in 
average inflation rates of 1.44 percentage points. The actual mean decline in inflation is 
2.3 percentage points.  By this approach, we conclude that increased independence 
explains 1.44/2.3 = 63% of the decline in average inflation rates. 
  5 
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Fry et al.  





Australia  2 50.00  6.40  73 3.33
Belgium  2 50.00  4.10  77 2.22
Canada  2.5 62.50  4.50  91  2.54
Denmark  2.5 62.50  6.50  88  2.44
France  2 50.00  6.10  90 2.01
Germany  4 100.00  3.00  96 2.41
Italy  1.75 43.75  7.30  88  4.14
Japan  2.5 62.50  4.90  93  1.10
Netherlands  2.5 62.50  4.20  91  2.41
New Zealand  1 25.00  7.60  89 2.68
Norway  2 50.00  6.10  57 2.85
Spain  1.5 37.50  8.50  80  4.35
Sweden  2 50.00  6.10  97 1.65
Switzerland  4 100.00  3.20  90 2.27
UK  2 50.00  6.70  77 3.98
USA  3.5 87.50  4.10  92  3.25
Austria          68  2.43
Finland          91  2.70
Greece          86  5.29
Hong Kong          74  6.10
Iceland          59  6.17
Ireland          87  2.79
Korea          73  5.51
Portugal          85  6.36
Singapore          90  1.98
Taiwan          85  2.73
                
Mean    58.98 5.58 83.44 3.30
Std. Dev.    20.91 1.62  10.70  1.48 
Number    16 16 26 26
 
                                                 
2 Alesina and Summers (1993) independence measure was a 0-4 scale.  To make it comparable to the 0-100 
scale of Fry et al. (2000), we multiplied the Alesina and Summers independence measure by 25.   
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